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I. INTRODUCTION  
United States National Bank highlights and exemplifies several well-
established propositions about the ability of courts to raise legal issues, 
including dispositive legal issues, sua sponte: (1) American courts are 
universally regarded as having such power; (2) that power is not limited to 
matters that affect the court’s jurisdiction; (3) there are, however, strong 
currents in the law that are hostile to the exercise of such power; (4) the power 
to raise issues sua sponte will not always be exercised, so that many, and 
perhaps even most, waivers of legal issues by parties will be honored; and (5) 
there is no articulated set of criteria for determining when such power should 
or will be exercised.1 
Quietly, and without much fanfare, sua sponte2 decisionmaking has become 
de rigueur. The Supreme Court of the United States has shown a particular 
interest in sua sponte decisionmaking, having confronted this issue in a number 
of recent cases.3 Further evidence of its growing popularity can be found in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which was recently amended to expressly 
approve of sua sponte consideration of summary judgment.4 For the most part, 
                                                                                                                       
 ∗ Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law.  
 1 Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1217 (2011) (citing U.S. 
Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993)).  
 2 “Sua sponte” means “[w]ithout prompting or suggestion; on its own motion.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1560 (9th ed. 2009). 
 3 See, e.g., Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (2012) (reversing a court of 
appeals’ sua sponte dismissal of a habeas corpus proceeding for expiration of the applicable 
statute of limitations); Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2562 (2008) (vacating a 
court of appeals’ sua sponte increase in a criminal defendant’s sentence); Day v. 
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (affirming a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a 
habeas corpus proceeding for expiration of the applicable statute of limitations).  
 4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). Rule 56(f), entitled “Judgment Independent of the Motion,” 
now provides:  
After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may: 
 (1) grant summary judgment for a nonmovant; 
 (2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or 
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this movement toward a greater use of sua sponte decisionmaking has generated 
little opposition or scholarly criticism.5 
This new-found interest in sua sponte decisionmaking seems somewhat 
surprising, for this practice has long been largely discredited.6 Admittedly, the 
notion that federal court judges have at least some power to act sua sponte 
seems beyond dispute.7 Also seemingly beyond dispute are at least certain 
aspects of the process that should be employed in this context—for example, 
that the parties ordinarily should be given notice of the act contemplated by the 
court and an opportunity to respond thereto.8 Still, some concerns about sua 
sponte decisionmaking remain. This is, broadly speaking, the purpose of this 
Essay: to explore in greater detail the nature of sua sponte decisionmaking, and 
in the course of doing so, to consider some of the problems associated 
therewith, problems that of late might have been underappreciated. Hopefully, 
this Essay will provide some guidance as to when sua sponte decisionmaking 
might be appropriate and when it might not, and whether there exist alternative 
procedures for accomplishing essentially the same goals, but at less cost. 
II. ISOLATING THE SUA SPONTE ACT 
Before considering the relative desirability of sua sponte decisionmaking, 
an opening observation might be made. It seems that it might be useful, when 
discussing sua sponte decisionmaking, to separate the sua sponte aspect (i.e., the 
decision to act sua sponte) from the underlying decision itself. For example, in 
Greenlaw v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals 
improperly increased a criminal defendant’s sentence on its own motion and in 
the absence of an appeal by the government.9 Yet no one seemed to believe that 
the court of appeals’ calculation as to the appropriate sentence was incorrect as 
a substantive matter; the problem, rather, related to the manner in which this 
error was corrected. Greenlaw therefore demonstrates that there might be 
occasions in which sua sponte decisionmaking is inappropriate, or less 
                                                                                                                       
 (3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material  
facts that may not be genuinely in dispute. 
 5 Though the focus of this Essay is on federal practice (both civil and criminal), the 
same considerations presumedly would apply to state court practice. 
 6 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
353, 385 (1978) (concluding that “the adjudicative process should normally not be initiated 
by the tribunal itself”); id. at 388 (adding that ideally an “arbiter” should “rest[] his decision 
wholly on the proofs and arguments actually presented to him by the parties”). Though not 
published in this form until 1978, after Professor Fuller’s death, his article was based in part 
on lectures he delivered in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s. See id. at 353 (“Special Editor’s 
Note”).  
 7 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. For more on this notion, see infra  
Parts IV and V. 
 8 See Day, 547 U.S. at 210 (“Of course, before acting on its own initiative, a court 
must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.”).  
 9 See Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2562 (2008). 
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desirable, even if the decision reached is (in some sense) substantively 
correct.10 And it also seems that the opposite is almost certainly true as well, for 
there must be times when a court appropriately acts sua sponte, yet reaches the 
wrong result.11 So the first point is that, when discussing the propriety of sua 
sponte decisionmaking, one should focus on the decision to act sua sponte itself, 
and not necessarily on the result of that decision. The one might well be proper 
even if the other is not.12 
III. THE UBIQUITY OF SUA SPONTE DECISIONMAKING 
In order to further understand sua sponte decisionmaking, it also might be 
helpful to consider the breadth of this subject. Though the Supreme Court tends 
to focus on some of the more controversial exercises of sua sponte 
decisionmaking, this practice actually is much more pervasive than might first 
appear. Indeed, even the terminology in this area masks its pervasiveness, as sua 
sponte decisionmaking tends to be described in a number of different ways,13 
and sometimes it is not described at all. 
Consider, for example, two events that occur in almost every case14: the 
assignment of the presiding judge, and the selection of the trial date. In most 
cases, the assignment of the presiding judge and the selection of the date of trial 
are fairly inconsequential; neither should substantially affect the ultimate 
outcome. But as many lawyers know, the identity of the presiding judge 
sometimes can have a significant effect on the outcome. And even the date of 
                                                                                                                       
 10 Actually, the situation in Greenlaw was more complicated than that, as the court of 
appeals’ act also ran afoul of another norm: the norm against raising new issues on appeal. 
See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a 
federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”). Generally 
speaking, concerns about sua sponte decisionmaking and raising new issues on appeal are 
both rooted in the preservation of our adversary system of justice. The concept of dicta raises 
similar concerns. See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-
Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 19 n.72 (2011) (discussing the connection between 
dicta doctrine and adversariness). Though much might be gained from a study of the 
similarities between these subjects (and perhaps others), that is an undertaking for another 
time. But for more on the relationship between sua sponte decisionmaking and the adversary 
process, see infra Part IV. 
 11 Indeed, it might well be that a court would be more likely to reach the wrong 
decision when it acts sua sponte. For more on this notion, see infra Part IV. 
 12 Thus, though this Essay will continue to refer to sua sponte decisionmaking, it should 
now be clear that it is the sua sponte aspect that is at issue here, and accordingly that this 
process may be distinguished from non-sua sponte (i.e., “traditional” judicial) 
decisionmaking. 
 13 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) (variously describing the authority of the district court 
to “grant summary judgment for a nonmovant”; grant a motion for summary judgment “on 
grounds not raised by a party”; and grant summary judgment in favor of a party “on its 
own”).  
 14 Because sua sponte decisionmaking arises in both civil actions and criminal cases, 
this Essay uses the generic term “case” to refer to both. 
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trial can have some effect on the outcome, as many lawyers who have been 
assigned a trial date in December or immediately after some traumatic event 
(such as occurred on September 11, 2001) can attest. And yet, as important as 
those choices might be, the parties generally have little, if any, input with 
respect to either.15 It is true that the assignment of the presiding judge is usually 
limited to those judges assigned to the district in which the case is pending, and 
might be influenced by some factors within the parties’ control, such as the 
location of the particular courthouse where the case was initiated. Similarly, the 
parties might be asked or permitted to provide their views regarding the 
estimated length of the trial and the time needed to prepare for trial. But the 
parties ultimately have little or no control over the assignment of the presiding 
judge or the selection of the trial date; those are decisions almost exclusively 
within the control of the court. 
Upon further reflection, one could easily come up with numerous other 
examples. One has already been mentioned: the ability of courts to raise legal 
issues sua sponte.16 Indeed, virtually every question posed to the parties by a 
judge, such as those raised during a typical motion hearing or appellate oral 
argument, could be regarded as a form of sua sponte decisionmaking. So the 
second point is simply that sua sponte decisionmaking is quite widespread, and 
probably more widespread than many imagine. 
Why is this so? Some of the reasons will be explored in the next Part, but 
one reason why sua sponte decisionmaking is so widespread is that it is 
probably both inevitable and unavoidable, at least to some extent. Perhaps one 
could imagine a world in which virtually everything currently being done by 
judges without significant party input could be left to the parties themselves, 
such that even the most perfunctory matters would become adversarial 
proceedings. But at least with respect to some matters, this seems neither 
feasible nor desirable. Thus, it seems that the proper inquiry is not whether sua 
sponte decisionmaking should or should not be allowed, but rather when and to 
what extent sua sponte decisionmaking is desirable. 
                                                                                                                       
 15 The process for the selection of the presiding judge is prescribed generally by 28 
U.S.C. § 137 (2006), which provides in pertinent part: “The business of a court having more 
than one judge shall be divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the 
court.” Pursuant to this statute, the federal district courts have devised various schemes for 
making this determination, none of which appear to involve direct input from the parties. See 
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CTS. , http://www.uscourts.gov/Common/ FAQS.aspx (last 
visited June 10, 2012).  
Regarding the selection of the trial date, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, for 
example, generally requires the district court to issue a “scheduling order” in every case, FED 
R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1), and provides that this order may “set dates for pretrial conferences and 
for trial.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(v). But again, this particular aspect of the process 
seems to be done with little party input.  
 16 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court, the court 
is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the 
independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”). 
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IV. THE DISCRETIONARY NATURE OF SUA SPONTE DECISIONMAKING 
Yet another aspect of sua sponte decisionmaking relates to the discretionary 
nature of the decision to act sua sponte. In order to understand its discretionary 
nature, one might consider sua sponte decisionmaking generally as a spectrum, 
with what might appear to be the most permissible forms at one end, and the 
least permissible at the other. At the most permissible end of the spectrum, one 
might place decisions that seem to be mandatory, such as dismissals for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.17 At the other least permissible end, one might place 
decisions that seem more or less prohibited, such as the one made by the court 
of appeals in Wood v. Milyard to dismiss a habeas corpus proceeding for 
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations,18 or in Greenlaw v. United 
States to increase a criminal defendant’s sentence.19 
But this preliminary view might not be entirely accurate. Consider, again, 
what many deem to be the paradigmatic example of mandatory sua sponte 
decisionmaking: the dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Certainly, 
some authorities in this area might be construed as requiring courts to dismiss in 
this context. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 provides: “If the 
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court 
must dismiss the action.”20 But what these authorities actually seem to be 
saying is that if a federal district court becomes aware of a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss.21 It does not seem to require the court to 
conduct an independent inquiry regarding subject-matter jurisdiction in every 
case. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Greenlaw might be read as involving a 
situation (increasing a criminal defendant’s sentence) in which sua sponte 
decisionmaking is prohibited. But upon closer inspection, the Court’s holding 
actually seems more limited. For example, if a computational error in a 
defendant’s sentence were noticed by a district court prior to the entry of 
judgment, rather than by a court of appeals, there seems to be little doubt that 
the error could be corrected, even sua sponte. The problem in Greenlaw, then, 
was really more of timing, among other things. It was not the decision to act sua 
                                                                                                                       
 17 See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011) (“Courts do not 
usually raise claims or arguments on their own. But federal courts have an independent 
obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they 
must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to 
press.”). 
 18 See Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1831 (2012). 
 19 See Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2562 (2008). 
 20 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); see also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006) (“A 
statute of limitations defense . . . is not ‘jurisdictional,’ hence courts are under no obligation 
to raise the time bar sua sponte.”). 
 21 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (“[I]f the 
record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the 
defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it.” (quoting United States v. 
Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936))).  
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sponte per se. Similarly, in Wood, the Court reversed a dismissal by the court of 
appeals of the same nature as that affirmed by the Court in Day (expiration of 
the applicable statute of limitations) on the ground that, in Wood, the defense in 
question had been waived by the defendant.22 
  Thus, it appears that there are probably few, if any, decisions in which a 
court is required to act sua sponte, and even fewer in which a court is 
prohibited from so acting. Rather, the propriety of sua sponte decisionmaking, 
or rather the decision to act sua sponte, is dependent upon a number of other, 
highly context-specific factors. There does not appear to be anything inherent in 
the concept of sua sponte decisionmaking that either compels or prevents its 
use. It is, essentially, a discretionary concept.23 
But if sua sponte decisionmaking is a discretionary concept, one again 
might fairly ask why. The answer essentially seems to be the same as that given 
in any situation involving an exercise of a court’s discretion: that the court in 
this situation is attempting to balance competing policy interests. And here, the 
primary policy interest standing in opposition to sua sponte decisionmaking 
seems to relate to “the role of courts in our adversarial system.”24 
“The United States’ commitment to an adversarial system of justice is a 
defining and distinctive feature of its legal system.”25 
In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first 
instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, 
we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the 
role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.26 
                                                                                                                       
 22 See Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1831. 
 23 See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 
447 (1993) (observing that “[t]he Court of Appeals, accordingly, had discretion to consider 
the validity of section 92, and under the circumstances did not abuse it”). Of course, when 
this Essay speaks of “discretion,” it is speaking of “judicial discretion,” which might be 
more accurately termed “judgment.” See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
551 U.S. 308, 332 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Courts must apply 
judgment, to be sure. But judgment is not discretion.”). For more on the topic of judicial 
discretion, see Bradley Scott Shannon, Should Summary Judgment Be Granted?, 58 AM. U. 
L. REV. 85, 102–03 (2008). 
 24 Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2562. 
 25 Gorod, supra note 10, at 2. 
 26 Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2564; accord Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 
(2011) (“Under [our adversary] system, courts are generally limited to addressing the claims 
and arguments advanced by the parties.”); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 
(1991) (“What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is . . . the presence of a 
judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation 
himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the 
parties.”); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 2 
(1984) (“The central precept of the adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of proofs 
presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic setting is most likely to come the 
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A fear of judicial bias seems to lie at its core,27 though other concerns are 
implicated as well.28 
The adversary system (and the reasoning behind it) represents a powerful 
interest, so powerful that, in most situations, it should hold sway. On the other 
side of the balance, though, are competing interests that sometimes weigh in 
favor of judicial intervention and occasionally tip the balance in favor of sua 
sponte decisionmaking.29 Thus, though a court might be under no obligation to 
investigate the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction, once a defect is found, 
that court seemingly has no option but to dismiss.30 Courts also have some 
obligation to administer justice, a duty that might at times call for some 
assistance to the unrepresented (or underrepresented).31 The need for efficiency 
                                                                                                                       
information upon which a neutral and passive decision maker can base the resolution of a 
litigated dispute acceptable to both the parties and society.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 502 (2009) 
(“The fear is that judges will be unable to remain impartial when deciding legal questions 
that they themselves have inserted into the litigation. Furthermore, the appearance of justice 
might suffer because the litigants and the general public might conclude that the judge is 
now a partisan player in the litigation rather than a detached observer to the dispute.”); 
Fuller, supra note 6, at 386 (arguing that a judge that engages in sua sponte decisionmaking 
“forms theories about what happened” and “cannot bring to the public hearing an 
uncommitted mind,” and that “the effectiveness of participation through proofs and reasoned 
arguments is accordingly reduced”). 
 28 See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 157 
(4th ed. 1998) (“The theory (or hope) underlying this model is that the truth will emerge if 
each party is given unbridled opportunity to present the full panoply of evidence, facts, and 
arguments before a neutral and attentive judge (and jury).”); Robert G. Bone, Improving 
Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 306 (2010) (“Our 
procedural system appears to value a party’s personal participation for reasons of dignity and 
legitimacy in addition to outcome quality.”). Incidentally, whether the adversary system 
represents the “best” judicial system (at least in its “pure” form) is debatable, and as the 
authorities discussed in this Part indicate, some have questioned its ability to ascertain the 
truth and administer justice, among other qualities. But unlike so many other works touching 
on this subject, the purpose here is not to criticize the adversary system. That the Supreme 
Court appears to be quite committed to it, at least as a general matter, seems reason enough 
to rely on it for present purposes. 
 29 See Gorod, supra note 10, at 2–3 & n.3 (“Surprisingly often, for example, the 
Supreme Court will reach out to decide an issue that was not raised by the parties.”). 
 30 See supra notes 17, 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 31 As Professor Frost explains: 
 By raising overlooked issues and legal authority, a judge can ameliorate the 
imbalances that undermine the adversarial system. For that very reason, judges have a 
tradition of assisting pro se litigants with case presentation. The same rationale that 
permits judges to depart from the party presentation rule in pro se cases should apply in 
cases in which one lawyer is clearly outgunned. This exception to the principle of party 
presentation should be viewed not as a deviation from adversary theory, but rather as a 
means of promoting adversarialism by ensuring that it works as best it can. The judge 
can make the adversary system more efficient at reaching just and accurate outcomes by 
helping to right the imbalance in opposing lawyers’ skills and resources. 
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also plays a role and sometimes calls for sua sponte decisionmaking,32 as does 
the need to avoid grievous errors33 and to make correct statements as to the 
governing law.34 
But these competing interests that sometimes call for departures from our 
adversarial model themselves should be exercised with due regard for the limits 
of what some have called “managerial” judging.35 Though federal judges 
generally bring a wealth of legal knowledge and experience to the adjudication 
of a case,36 they also have some substantial deficiencies vis-à-vis the parties. 
For one thing, judges never know as much about the case as the parties.37 For 
                                                                                                                       
Frost, supra note 27, at 501; see also William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent 
Counsel—The Trial Judge’s Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633, 639 (1980) (“If the process by 
which justice is administered is to work as intended, lawyers must perform their functions 
adequately. When it appears in the course of litigation that a lawyer’s performance is falling 
short, it should be the trial judge’s responsibility, as the person responsible for the manner in 
which justice is administered in his court, to take appropriate action. The question 
confronting the trial judge, therefore, is not whether intervention can be reconciled with the 
adversarial process, but how to exercise the discretion to intervene so as to accommodate the 
competing demands of that process.”).  
 32 See, e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06 (2006) (justifying, in part, the 
sua sponte dismissal of a habeas corpus proceeding for expiration of the applicable statute of 
limitation on the grounds that the statute “promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of 
judicial resources, safeguards the accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution 
of constitutional questions while the record is fresh, and lends finality to state court 
judgments within a reasonable time.” (quoting Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 
2000))). 
 33 See, e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2575 (2008) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he interest of the public and the Judiciary in correcting grossly prejudicial 
errors of law may sometimes outweigh other interests normally furthered by fidelity to our 
adversarial tradition.”). 
 34 See, e.g., Sarah M. R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 
251–52 (2004) (arguing that “judges should at least be strongly encouraged to be more 
‘involved’ . . . by using their discretion to improve the law by implementing the most correct 
reasoning”). As noted previously, though, sua sponte decisionmaking is but one of a number 
of challenges to the adversary system. See supra note 10; see also Wood v. Milyard, 132 
S. Ct. 1826, 1833 (2012) (observing that the “exhaustion doctrine,” which generally 
prohibits appellate courts from considering issues not raised below, “is founded on concerns 
broader than those of the parties,” and therefore “is not absolute”). 
 35 See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
 36 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 27, at 507 (“Most federal judges practiced law for several 
decades before taking the bench, and many were selected for a federal judgeship precisely 
because they were unusually successful lawyers. Federal judges are conditioned to think 
about the case as an advocate, and thus to formulate the best legal arguments for each side.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 37 Cf. Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (observing that “[o]ur adversary system is designed around 
the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing 
the facts and arguments entitling them to relief”). Indeed, if a judge did know as much about 
the case as the parties, the judge might well have to recuse. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2006) 
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this reason, a judge acting sua sponte might well take some action that makes 
little sense to the parties and that would not be taken if the judge had more 
information.38 As the Supreme Court explained long ago, “[t]he determination 
of what may be useful to [a party] can properly and effectively be made only by 
an advocate.”39 Similarly, judges never know the circumstances surrounding 
cases as well as the parties. For example, what if, in Day, the State of Florida 
had good and valid reasons for not asserting a statute of limitations defense? 
What if it preferred to get a decision on the merits that would have settled the 
underlying substantive issue raised in that case once and for all?40 By raising an 
issue sua sponte, the court potentially places at least one of the parties in the 
awkward (and time-consuming) position either of defending a position it would 
not have asserted or explaining to the court why it is not pursuing what might 
seem to a relative outsider to be a preferable course.41 Regardless of the 
decision made, the dynamic of the litigation is changed, probably to the 
disadvantage of one of the parties.42 Thus, though sua sponte decisionmaking 
                                                                                                                       
(requiring a federal judge to “disqualify himself” if he has “personal knowledge of disputed 
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings”). 
 38 See Frost, supra note 27, at 506 (“Adversary process is praised for its compatibility 
with judges’ core institutional competences. Judges are well suited to resolving disputes 
initiated by the parties, but lack the institutional capacity to frame cases themselves. Judges 
do not have the staff or funds to personally investigate the facts of the cases that come before 
them, nor do they share the parties’ incentives to uncover all the information that could assist 
them in making their case.”). 
 39 Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966); see also Frost, supra note 27, at 
506–07 (“In contrast [to judges], private litigants will bring those cases most important to 
them, and are well situated, and highly motivated, to unearth the facts and sources of law 
that will support their case.”). 
 40 See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 217–18 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There 
are many reasons why the State may wish to disregard the statute of limitations, including 
the simple belief that it would be unfair to impose the limitations defense on a particular 
defendant.”). 
 41 There are other problems potentially associated with managerial judging. For a more 
thorough discussion (that also references much of the earlier scholarship in this area), see 
generally Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961 (2007). 
 42 There are undoubtedly a host of other factors that, depending on the circumstances, 
might counsel against the exercise of sua sponte decisionmaking. Though it is not the 
purpose of this Essay to catalog all of them, some that immediately come to mind include 
the following: 
 • The stage in the proceedings. Generally speaking, sua sponte decisionmaking 
occurring later in the proceedings seems to be more problematic than that occurring 
earlier, if for no other reason than that there is less time to compensate for its impacts 
and because materiality tends to increase in later stages. 
 • The nature of the court. Trial courts are primarily courts of original jurisdiction. Their 
function is to try the issues presented by the parties as a matter of first impression, to 
determine the facts, and to apply the law. Appellate courts, on the other hand, are 
primarily courts of appellate jurisdiction; their function is one of review and of error 
correction. The record on appeal tends to be limited, as is those courts’ ability to 
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might be tolerable for certain perfunctory, housekeeping-type matters, with 
respect to more significant matters, a court’s discretion in this area probably 
should be exercised only in the most exceptional of circumstances.43 
                                                                                                                       
consider new evidence. See Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (2012) (“When a 
court of appeals raises a procedural impediment to disposition on the merits, and 
disposes of the case on that ground, the district court’s labor is discounted and the 
appellate court acts not as a court of review but as one of first view.”); id. at 1836 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Appellate courts . . . are particularly ill 
suited to consider issues forfeited below.”). For these reasons, sua sponte 
decisionmaking might be more appropriate in the trial courts than the appellate courts. 
 • The nature and purpose of the act. Presumably, a court should be more hesitant to act 
sua sponte if the resulting decision would have a significant, or even dispositive, impact 
on the case. Greenlaw again provides an example, wherein the court of appeals 
increased the defendant’s sentence by fifteen years. See Greenlaw v. United States, 128 
S. Ct. 2559, 2562 (2008). Sometimes, though, the nature or purpose of the decision can 
mollify its significance. For example, a sua sponte decrease in a criminal defendant’s 
sentence seems more acceptable than a sua sponte increase. (One might consider, for 
example, what the outcome might have been in Greenlaw had this been the scenario.) 
And there is little question that the dismissal of a case on statute of limitations grounds, 
as in Day, has certain salutary effects on the judicial system regardless of how it is 
accomplished. 
 • The existence of alternative procedures. Courts should be sensitive to the existence of 
alternative procedures (particularly express or otherwise well-established procedures) 
that might obviate or alleviate the need for sua sponte decisionmaking. Day again 
provides a good example. See 547 U.S. at 216–17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing, in 
contrast to the sua sponte assertion of an unpleaded statute of limitations defense, that 
“there already exists a well-developed body of law to govern the district courts’ 
exercise of discretion under Rule 15(a)” that would have allowed the defendant to 
amend its answer and assert the same). 
 • The ability to challenge the court’s decision. Some thought might be given to the 
ability to challenge realistically a decision made sua sponte. Consider again the 
assignment of the presiding judge and the selection of the trial date. Though the parties 
generally have little input with respect to either, there is the opportunity, by statute, to 
seek a recusal in appropriate circumstances, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) 
(“[d]isqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge”), and to modify the trial date, 
see FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4) (providing that the trial date “may be modified . . . for good 
cause and with the judge’s consent”). These procedures stand in some contrast to the 
typical “motion for reconsideration,” a procedure that presumably would have little 
chance of succeeding in this context. Additional problems can occur when sua sponte 
decisionmaking occurs on appeal. If a district court decides to act sua sponte, the losing 
party likely will have the opportunity to seek review of that decision, such as occurred 
in Day. But what if the decision to act sua sponte occurs in the court of appeals? In 
Wood, as well as in Greenlaw, the parties had the opportunity for further review by the 
Supreme Court. But that will not be true in the vast majority of cases. Only rarely does 
the Supreme Court grant petitions for a writ of certiorari, meaning most sua sponte 
decisionmaking in the court of appeals probably goes unreviewed. 
 43 As Professor Frost concludes: 
 The parties are . . . in the best position to find and make all the arguments in 
their favor, and usually (though not always) can be relied upon to do so. Issue creation 
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V. A NOTE ON THE CODIFICATION OF SUA SPONTE PROCEDURES 
Assuming that sua sponte decisionmaking, though something that should be 
invoked only rarely, is sometimes appropriate, at least two questions remain. 
One question relates to how such decisionmaking should be accomplished. That 
is the subject of the last Part. Another question is whether sua sponte 
decisionmaking should be codified in some manner, and if so, how. 
There are numerous provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that 
authorize sua sponte decisionmaking.44 This is not particularly surprising, for, 
as discussed previously,45 there appear to be few, if any, situations in which sua 
sponte decisionmaking is prohibited in all cases.46 But if this conclusion is 
true—i.e., if sua sponte decisionmaking is broadly discretionary—then why the 
need to provide for sua sponte decisionmaking on a piecemeal basis? Perhaps it 
would be better (simpler, clearer, etc.) to provide for the possibility of sua 
sponte decisionmaking more generally in a single rule, which could then be 
applied by courts regardless of the specific nature of the act contemplated. 
Yet, given that sua sponte decisionmaking represents an extraordinary act 
that should be invoked by courts only rarely, perhaps there is an even better 
solution. Courts have long been regarded as having the power to act sua sponte 
even in the absence of any positive authority along that line. For example, Rule 
56, even prior to its recent amendment,47 had long been understood as allowing 
for sua sponte motions for summary judgment.48 Moreover, as Professor 
Lawson observes, courts have had difficulty articulating the criteria for 
                                                                                                                       
should not be an everyday occurrence, because it can lead to delay, disrupt settled 
expectations, and undermine litigant autonomy. 
Frost, supra note 27, at 453; see also Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2575 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“A 
reviewing court will generally address an argument sua sponte only to correct the most 
patent and serious errors.”); Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts 
Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1307–08 
(2002) (explaining the view that “appellate courts should be permitted to raise 
nonjurisdictional matters sua sponte only in the most exceptional cases, to remedy the 
gravest injustices”). 
 44 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); 5(c)(1); 6(b)(1)(A); 11(c)(3); 11(c)(5)(B); 12(f)(1); 
12(h)(3); 16(a); 21; 25(d); 26(b)(2)(C); 39(a)(2); 39(c)(1); 48(c); 56(f); 59(d); 60(a); 
71.1(i)(2); 73(b)(3). This list is not intended to be exhaustive; indeed, because it includes 
only rules that clearly seem to authorize sua sponte decisionmaking, it is almost certainly 
under-inclusive. Variations in terminology, among other problems, make it difficult in some 
instances to determine whether sua sponte decisionmaking was actually intended.  
 45 See supra Part IV. 
 46 Indeed, given the number of specific references to sua sponte decisionmaking in the 
Rules, an uninitiated reader might draw the negative inference that sua sponte 
decisionmaking is prohibited in all other situations. It seems unlikely, though, that this was 
the drafters’ intent. 
 47 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 48 See 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2720, at 339–55 (3d ed. 1998). 
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determining when sua sponte decisionmaking is appropriate,49 and no such 
articulation has found its way into the Rules. For these reasons, perhaps sua 
sponte decisionmaking is a matter that is better left unstated. Perhaps it should 
not be included in the Rules at all, and instead be considered just another aspect 
of the federal courts’ inherent authority.50 
VI. A BETTER WAY 
A final thought relates to the manner in which a court should conduct sua 
sponte decisionmaking. As has already been discussed, a court certainly should 
give the parties notice of the act being considered and an opportunity to be 
heard on that issue.51 But there are times when notice and an opportunity to be 
heard are not enough. For example, in Day, “the Magistrate Judge gave Day due 
notice and a fair opportunity to show why the limitation period should not yield 
dismissal of the petition.”52 But the Magistrate Judge did not seem at all 
interested in the antecedent question of whether the court should have acted sua 
sponte in the first instance. Yet, given the extraordinary nature of sua sponte 
decisionmaking, as well as the problems potentially associated therewith, 
perhaps courts should never act sua sponte, at least as an initial matter. Perhaps 
instead courts should begin by giving the parties the opportunity to express their 
views as to whether the court should act sua sponte at all. For example, in Day, 
the Court admonished: “[T]he court must assure itself that the petitioner is not 
significantly prejudiced by the delayed focus on the limitation issue, and 
determine whether the interests of justice would be better served by addressing 
                                                                                                                       
 49 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Greenlaw v. United States, 128 
S. Ct. 2559, 2570 n.9 (2008) (questioning whether “the error [was] ‘so grossly prejudicial,’ 
so harmful to our system of justice, as to warrant sua sponte correction? By what standard is 
the Court of Appeals to make such an assessment?” (quoting Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2574 
(Alito, J., dissenting))); Cravens, supra note 34, at 261 (observing that case law in this area 
“leaves unclear the extent or scope of discretion or obligation on the part of courts, and it 
also leaves very unclear the level of involvement of the parties and the power of courts to 
issue their own decisions on the matters”); Frost, supra note 27, at 503 n.204 
(“Unfortunately, the judiciary’s reputation for impartiality has suffered under the status quo, 
in which courts make ad hoc exceptions to the norm of party presentation without 
articulating a rationale for doing so.”); cf. Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1835–36 
(2012) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (questioning the Court’s distinction in this 
context between forfeited and waived defenses). 
 50 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (describing powers 
“governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage 
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases” (quoting 
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962))); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) 
(providing that when there is no controlling law, “[a] judge may regulate practice in any 
manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and 
the district’s local rules”). 
 51 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 52 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006). 
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the merits or by dismissing the petition as time barred.”53 But why not let the 
parties conduct this analysis? Why not simply alert counsel to the issue and 
allow the parties to take whatever action they think appropriate?54 The parties 
will usually take the same (or better) tack as that the court would take, though 
with less disruption to the norm of party presentation.55 Thus, the choice is not, 
as the Day Court suggested, between acting sua sponte and doing nothing.56 
There is a middle ground. 
                                                                                                                       
 53 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54 This is essentially the approach suggested by Justice Scalia in Day. See id. at 216 n.2 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Rather, a judge may call the timeliness issue to the State’s attention 
and invite a motion to amend the pleadings under Civil Rule 15(a) . . . .”). The Day majority 
also acknowledged the propriety of this approach. See id. at 209 (majority opinion) 
(observing that the trial court, “instead of acting sua sponte, might have informed the State 
of its obvious computation error and entertained an amendment to the State’s answer”). 
 55 There might be a few situations in which the court would be required to act even in 
the absence of party action. For example, though the parties should be permitted to explain 
(or argue) why the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, an unpersuaded court must dismiss 
the case, even in the absence of a motion by a party. But in most situations, the court will not 
be in a good position to second-guess the decision made by the parties. See supra notes 35–
42 and accompanying text.  
 56 See Day, 547 U.S. at 208 (“In lieu of an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever 
[a statute’s] one-year clock has run, or, at the opposite extreme, a rule treating the State’s 
failure initially to plead the one-year bar as an absolute waiver, [the Court] reads the statutes, 
Rules, and decisions in point to permit the exercise of discretion in each case to decide 
whether the administration of justice is better served by dismissing the case on statute of 
limitations grounds or by reaching the merits of the petition.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
